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Abstract In the present study, we examined the role of
fairness and offer size on brain and cardiac responses in the
ultimatum game (UG). Twenty healthy volunteers played
the role of responder in a computerized version of the UG
in which the fairness and size of the offers were
systematically varied. Both fairness and size of the offer
influenced the acceptance rates in a predictable way,
leading to fewer accepted unfair and low offers. Only
unfair high, but not unfair low offers were accompanied by
a medial frontal negativity. An unexpected stronger cardiac
deceleration to fairer offers was found, which was not
affected by the size of the offers. Cardiac and electrocortical
measures showed a different relation with performance, and
both measures were correlated only modestly. This disso-
ciation between cardiac responses and brain potentials is
discussed in terms of a possible differential sensitivity to
effects of stimulus probability and violation of the social
rules.
Keywords Decision-making.Emotion.Erp
Introduction
The ultimatum game (UG; Güth, Schmittberger, &
Schwarze 1982) can be used to study emotion regulation
during social interactions. In the UG, two players have to
agree on how to divide a sum of money. The first player
(the proposer) makes an offer of how to split the money
between the two of them. The second player (the responder)
decides whether to accept or reject this offer. If the
responder accepts the offer, the money will be divided as
proposed. If the responder rejects the offer, neither player
gets anything. In both cases, the game is over. According to
standard economic theory, the rational strategy is for the
proposer to offer the lowest possible amount (in order to
keep as much money for himself as possible) and for the
responder to accept even the smallest amount, since the
alternative is getting nothing at all. A large number of
studies, however, have found that the majority of proposers
and responders act differently. Depending on culture and
setting, the basic finding is that most proposers are
unexpectedly generous and tend to offer 40%–50% of the
stake. The responders accept these offers but reject about
half of the unfair offers (i.e., less than 20%–30% of the total
amount) (Nowak, Page, & Sigmund, 2000). This more or
less irrational behavior shown by the participants suggests
that humans are not entirely rational during economic
decision making, because responders appear to be sensitive
to unfairness and are willing to reject unfair offers so that
they can punish proposers for unfair treatment. And
realizing this, proposers make generous offers that are less
likely to be refused by the responders (Nowak et al., 2000).
This behavior can be seen as the result of the complex
interaction between emotional (fairness) and cognitive,
more rational (financial gain) processes in the human brain
while making financial decisions.
Various studies have identified several brain areas
involved in the UG. In a first study (Sanfey, Rilling,
Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003), it was found that
receiving unfair offers was associated with increased
activation in, among other areas, the dorsal part of the
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). This finding was inter-
preted in terms of a reflection of the conflict between the
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research indicates that the ACC is also involved in the
affective components of both physical and social pain
(Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; Eisenberger, Lieberman,
& Williams, 2003; Price, 2000; Tolle et al., 1999). The
dACC has also been implicated in error processing,
uncertainty, conflict, and negative feedback. Although the
finding of increased activation in the dACC could not be
replicated in a second fMRI study using more or less the
same paradigm (Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008), a
recent event-related brain potential (ERP) study seemed to
provide more evidence for involvement of the dACC
(Boksem & De Cremer, 2010). This study showed that
unfair offers in the UG were accompanied by a negative-
going wave, peaking about 300 ms after stimulus onset and
maximal at right frontal electrode positions. The authors
interpreted this negativity as a reflection of negative social
outcomes in the UG. Furthermore, they related this wave to
a group of negative-going ERP components thought to be
generated in the dACC (Dehaene et al., 1994; Gehring &
Willoughby, 2002), which are often referred to as medial
frontal negativities (MFNs; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002).
These MFNs have been found in similar paradigms that
have also been used in fMRI research and in which it has
been found that the dACC was active. An MFN has been
found for errors, conflict, unexpected punishment, and
negative feedback, and one of the most influential theories
in which this group of ERP components has been
considered has proposed that, in almost all paradigms, the
MFN reflects a reinforcement learning signal that occurs
whenever outcomes are worse than expected (Holroyd &
Coles, 2002). In this way, the MFN evoked by unfair offers
can be seen as an outcome (offer) that is worse than
expected (unfair) because the social norm of fairness has
been violated. It should be noted, however, that an earlier
study reported a similar negative deflection that was
strongest for medium fair offers (30% of the stake), as
compared with fair (50%) and unfair (10%) offers, but
localized this negativity in other brain areas (Polezzi et al.,
2008).
The emotional reaction to unfair offers has been further
explored by examining the expression of the emotion in
terms of bodily responses. In a recent study (Osumi &
Ohira, 2009), it was found that unfair offers were
accompanied by cardiac deceleration, as compared with
fair offers. Moreover, this deceleration was even more
pronounced if the stimuli were categorized in terms of
rejected and accepted offers. They concluded that cardiac
deceleration predicted the rejection of an offer, which is
more or less in line with the somatic marker hypothesis,
which states that bodily responses can serve as markers for
important decisions (Damasio, 1996). It has been suggested
that the cardiac response to feedback stimuli, which is
possibly related to the response to unfair offers, reflects
different aspects of the feedback stimulus than does the
MFN (Van der Veen, Mies, van der Molen, & Evers, 2008;
Van der Veen, Nieuwenhuis, van der Molen, & Crone,
2004a). It has been hypothesized that the cardiac response
is more strongly related to the emotional impact of the
feedback stimulus, whereas the MFN more strongly reflects
the cognitive, evaluative aspect (Van der Veen, van der
Molen, Crone, & Jennings, 2004b). By combining both
measures and differentially manipulating cognitive and
emotional aspects, more can be learned about the relation
between the brain response and the bodily response and the
differential impact of cognitive and emotional task aspects
on these measures. The fast cardiac deceleration following
motivationally significant events has traditionally been
interpreted as being part of the orienting response (OR;
Graham & Clifton, 1966). Recently, it has been suggested
that the physiological processes underlying the OR and the
P3 component might strongly overlap and that both might
be strongly related (Nieuwenhuis, De Geus, & Aston-Jones,
2011). Interpreted like this, we would expect differential
effects of expectancy, which should more strongly affect the
OR, cardiac deceleration, and the P3, and outcomes worse
than expected, which should more strongly affect the MFN.
In both the studies using ERP measures and the studies
using cardiac measures, the size of the offer and the fairness
of the offer were confounded; that is, larger offers were
automatically fairer. Therefore, it is unclear which role the
specific context of an offer plays in both cardiac and brain
responses. As was stated before, it is, furthermore, unclear
how the cardiac responses and brain responses are related
and whether they reflect the same processes. Therefore, we
chose to simultaneously examine both cardiac and electro-
cortical responses to offers in a version of the UG in which
relevance and fairness can be studied independently.
Fairness was manipulated by varying the proportion of the
amount of money offered, and relevance was examined by
manipulating the offer size. It was expected that unfair and
smaller offers would be experienced as less pleasant and
would be rejected more often, as compared with fairer and
bigger offers (Tabibnia et al., 2008). We hypothesized that
we would find a stronger cardiac deceleration and a larger
MFN to unfair offers, as compared with the fair offers
(Boksem & De Cremer, 2010; Osumi & Ohira, 2009), and
that the more relevant, higher offers would evoke a stronger
cardiac and electrocortical response. Finally, it was
expected that the cardiac and ERP measures would show
only moderate to low correlations, on the basis of earlier
studies reporting absent or low correlations in comparable
paradigms (Mies, Van der Veen, Tulen, Hengeveld, & van
der Molen, 2011; Van der Veen et al., 2004a) and the
suggested differential sensitivity to emotional and cognitive
aspects of the offer.
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Participants
Twenty healthy volunteers (mean age 21.8 years, SD =
2.2; 3 males) participated in the study. All volunteers
were right-handed, and all had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Before the start of the experiment, all
participants were screened for neurological and psychiat-
ric disorders and were asked to fill out a general health
questionnaire. Persons were included if they reported
being healthy and did not report substance abuse or any
known neurological or psychiatric disorder in the past or
present. Research was approved by the local medical
ethical committee and was conducted in compliance with
the Helsinki Declaration and the regulations regarding
good clinical practice in the European Community (GCP)
and according to the current national regulations. All
participants were financially compensated for their par-
ticipation in our study. All participants provided oral and
written informed consent after the procedure had been
fully explained to them.
Stimuli and experimental design
The design of the UG was based on a previous study by
Crockett, Clark, Tabibnia, Lieberman, and Robbins
(2008), who used this task in a behavioral experiment
studying the effects of acute tryptophan depletion. In a
first separate session, the participants were instructed
about the nature and rules of the UG. To increase the
credibility of the UG, the participants were told that they
were part of a larger ongoing study in which they would
play only the role of the responder. They were told that
they would see 120 offers from different proposers on a
computer screen. To further increase credibility, the
participants were informed that the pictures of the
proposers they would see during the task were from
persons who had submitted their offers previously and
would not be present at the time of the experiment. In
reality, there were no real proposers, and the offers were
made up by us prior to the experiment. All participants
were informed that both themselves and these proposers
would be paid according to the choices made by the
present participants. Furthermore, they were told that they
would have the opportunity to play the role of proposer
with persons who would participate in the future. They
were asked if they would allow their photograph to be
taken and used in future sessions with other participants. If
they agreed, their photograph was taken, and they were
asked to come up with 10 different offers in the second
session. Five participants in our study declined having
their photograph taken.
In reality, the 30 different “proposers” that the partic-
ipants saw during the game were pictures from the Nimstim
Face Stimulus set (MacArthur Foundation Research Net-
work).
1 These were the only pictures that were used in our
experiment. The photographs of the participants were
immediately deleted after their departure. So there were
no actual proposers, and participants’ offers were used only
as a cover story and were not used for real in future trials of
our experiment.
In a second session, which was planned a week after the
first session, all participants performed the UG as receiver.
Participants were instructed again about the nature and rules
of the UG and were told once more that they would receive
the financial outcomes of 2 trials that would be randomly
selected out of the trials in the game. Furthermore, they
were instructed again about the consequences of an
“accept” or “reject” response and that the offers were real
but made by other volunteers who had participated
previously. All participants received the same 120 offers,
which were presented in a fixed quasirandom order. Offers
fell into one of the three fairness categories: fair, unfair, or
very unfair. Each category was subdivided into a high and
low stake size. So there were six categories of offers in our
experiment. The 120 trials were divided as follows: There
were 20 fair/high trials (40%–50% of €16), 20 unfair/high
trials (27%–33% of €25), and 20 very unfair/high trials
(18%–22% of €37.50). The same divisions also applied for
the low stake size offers. So there were also 20 fair/low
trials (40%–50% of €3,35), 20 unfair/low trials (27%–33%
of €5), and 20 very unfair/low trials (18%–22% of €7.50).
There were 30 different “proposers,” so each proposer
appeared 4 times during the game. We arranged the pictures
of the proposers in such a way that there was an equal balance
of gender and race among the faces of the proposers and the
pictures were shown in random order. Each trial consisted of
the presentation of a picture of the proposer’s face, which was
shown for 1.5 s, the presentation of the stake, which was
shown for 1 s, and the presentation of the offer, which was
shownfor3s(see,e.g.,Fig.1). During the presentation of the
offer, the participants had to decide whether to accept or
reject the offer by pressing the left or right button on a
response device with their right hand. After finishing the
game, the participants, who had allowed their pictures to be
taken and used in future trials for future participants, were
asked to play the role of proposer and to write 10 different
proposals on paper.
1 Development of the MacBrain Face Stimulus Set was overseen by
Nim Tottenham and was supported by the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Early Experience and
Brain Development. Please contact Nim Tottenham at tott0006@tc.
umn.edu for more information concerning the stimulus set
518 Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2011) 11:516–525Data acquisition
All physiological signals were amplified, sampled, and
stored on a portable amplifier (Vitaport System, Temec
Instruments B.V., Kerkrade). Electroencephalography
(EEG) signals were acquired from the following seven
electrode positions: F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, C4, and Pz (in
relation to A1-A2 of both mastoids), which were positioned
according to the international 10–20 system (Sharbrough et
al., 1991). Horizontal EOG was recorded from two electro-
des placed at the outer canthi of both eyes. Vertical EOG
was recorded from electrodes on the infraorbital and
supraorbital regions on the left eye. The EEG was sampled
at 256 Hz, low-pass filtered at 30 Hz, and high-pass filtered
with a time constant of 0.33 s. Electrode impedance was
again kept below 8 kOhm. The EEG signal was locked to
the onset of the offer, and epochs were extracted between
100 ms preceding and 700 ms following the onset of the
offer. The epochs were corrected for vertical EOG artifacts
by using a well-established correction method (Gratton,
Coles, & Donchin, 1983). Finally, epochs were visually
inspected and checked for artifacts, and epochs were
excluded from analysis when necessary.
The electrocardiogram (ECG) was recorded from pre-
cordial leads and sampled at 512 Hz. R-peaks were detected
offline with an accuracy of 2 ms, and the R-peak
occurrence times were visually inspected for artifacts and
corrected when necessary. The R-peak in the ECG has been
widely used to measure time between successive contrac-
tions of the heart, and in this way, heart rate and interbeat
intervals (IBIs) can be determined. Five IBIs surrounding
the offer were selected for further analysis: that is, the
preceding IBI (IBI 1), the concurrent IBI (i.e., IBI 0), and
three subsequent IBIs (i.e., IBIs 1, 2, and 3).
Statistical analysis
All measures were statistically evaluated using SPSS 16
(SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). An analysis of variance was
performed using a general linear model (GLM) repeated
measures design. Percentage of accepted offers was
examined using fairness (three levels; fair, unfair, and very
unfair) and offer size (two levels; high vs. low) as within-
subjects factors. For the MFN, we more or less followed the
analysis strategy used in the Boksem and De Cremer
(2010). Difference waves were computed between fair and
(very) unfair offers for both high and low offers to
minimize the effects of overlapping components. Visual
inspection of the grand average difference wave forms
indicated that the MFN was maximal at Fz around 400 ms
after the presentation of the offer. Due to the broad and
somewhat skewed distribution of the MFN, an area
between 375 and 475 ms after offer onset was chosen as
our latency window of interest, and MFN amplitude was
computed as the difference between fair and (very) unfair
offers in this window. MFN was statistically evaluated with
a GLM with electrode position (three levels; Fz, Cz, and
Pz), fairness (unfair vs. very unfair), and offer size as
within-subjects factor. Cardiac responses were examined
using sequential IBI (three levels; IBI0, IBI1, and IBI2),
fairness, and offer size as factors. For all analyses, Huynh–
Feldt corrections for degrees of freedom were applied when
necessary.
Results
The results of 2 participants were excluded due to technical
problems (n = 1) and not following instructions leading to
rejection of all offers (n = 1).
Behavior
The percentage of accepted offers is shown in Fig. 2 and was
tested with a GLM for repeated measures. Main effects of
offer size, F(1, 17) = 13.4, p <. 0 0 5 ,η
2 =. 4 4 0 ,a n df a i r n e s s ,
F(2, 34) = 93.0, p <. 0 0 0 5 ,η
2 = .845, and an interaction
between these two factors, F(2, 30) = 3.8, p <. 0 5 ,η
2 =. 1 8 1 ,
Fig. 1 Example of an offer stimulus (very unfair, high)
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Fig. 2 Percentage of accepted offers for high and low, fair, unfair, and
very unfair offers
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were accepted more often, and the effect of fairness was
larger for high offers. Only for the unfair and very unfair
offers was the effect of offer size significant. Reaction time
was also statistically evaluated using a GLM. A main effect
of offer size was found, F(1, 17) = 22.1, p <. 0 0 0 5 ,η
2 =
.565, as well as an interaction between offer size and
fairness, F(2, 30) = 8.8, p <. 0 0 1 ,η
2 = .340. Reactions to low
offers were faster, and only for these low offers was a
marginally significant effect of fairness found, with faster
responses for more unfair offers.
Event-related brain potentials
Grand average ERPs for all stimulus categories and
difference waves between fair and (very) unfair offers are
shown in Figs. 3 and 4. MFN amplitude, derived from the
three central electrodes (Fz, Cz, and Pz), was first
analyzed with a repeated measures GLM. Due to too
many measurement artifacts on the Pz electrode, 2
additional participants had to be excluded. In this analysis,
we found main effects of electrode position, F(2, 30) =
5.2, p <. 0 5 ,η
2 = .425, and offer size, F(1, 15 = 14.2, p <
.005, η
2 = .486. Follow-up one-sample t-tests showed that
MFN amplitude significantly differed from zero for both
unfair and very unfair high offers on Fz (N = 18; unfair,
2.9 μV; very unfair, 4.2 μV, p < .05) and Cz (N =1 8 ;
unfair, 3.1 μV; very unfair, 3.7 μV, p < .005), but not for
low offers and Pz (N = 16). In order to make our
electrocortical and cardiac results more comparable (see
below), we also tested whether rejected and accepted
trials differed with respect to MFN amplitude and
evaluated the MFN, defined as the difference between
accepted and rejected, with a GLM with electrode as
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Fig. 3 Grand average ERPs for high (left) and low (right) offers at mid-line electrodes. ERPs elicited by fair and unfair offers are shown, as well
as the difference wave between these two
520 Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2011) 11:516–525factor (see Fig. 5). We found no effect of electrode, and
also the follow-up one-sample t-tests of the MFN
amplitude for separate electrodes did not yield significant
effects. It should be noted that the effects on Cz (1.6 μV,
p = .056) and Fz (1.5 μV, p = .089) were close to
significant. Finally, we explored the possible relation
between overt behavior in terms of the average percentage
accepted offers and MFN amplitude either computed in
terms of fair and (very) unfair offers or computed in terms
of rejected or accepted offers. For this analysis, we found
a significant correlation only between percentage of
accepted offers and the MFN at Fz, computed as the
difference between accepted and rejected offers, R =. 5 9 ,
p < .01. This negative correlation means that a lower
percentage of accepted offers were associated with a larger
effect size in terms of MFN.
Heart rate
With a GLM for repeated measures, it was found that the
cardiac response to the offer showed a main effect of
sequential IBI, F(3, 51) = 8.1, p < .01, η
2 = .324, and a
marginally significant interaction between fairness and
sequential IBI, F(4, 68) = 2.6, p = .061, η
2 = .131.
Follow-up analyses showed that the effect of fairness (three
levels, tested with GLM) was only marginally significant at
IBI2. Further follow-up analyses showed that for IBI2, only
the difference between fair and very unfair offers (paired t-
test) was significant. As is shown in Fig. 6 (top panel), very
unfair offers led to less deceleration, as compared with fair
offers. In order to make our results more comparable to the
results of the previous study examining cardiac responses in
the UG (Osumi & Ohira, 2009), we also tested the
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Fig. 4 Grand average ERPs for high (left) and low (right) offers at mid-line electrodes. ERPs elicited by fair and very unfair offers are shown, as
well as the difference wave between these two
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GLM withacceptance(acceptedoffersvs.rejectedoffers) and
sequential IBI as within-subjects factors, we found a main
effect of sequential IBI, F(2, 34) = 5.3, p <. 0 5 ,η
2 =. 2 3 8 ,
and a marginally significant interaction between acceptance
and sequential IBI, F(3, 51) = 2.8, p =. 0 7 7 ,η
2 =. 1 4 0 .
Follow-up analyses showed that only IBI2 showed a
marginally significant difference between accepted and
rejected offers, caused by less deceleration for rejected
offers, as is shown in Fig. 6 (bottom panel). As for the
MFN amplitude, we also explored the possible relation
between cardiac responses and average percentage of
accepted offers. We found a correlation only for the
difference between fair and unfair offers at IBI2, and this
correlation was negative, R =. 5 2 , p < .05, which means that
higher percentages of accepted offers were associated with a
smaller effect size in terms of cardiac response.
Association cardiac and brain responses
The association between brain and cardiac responses was
explored by computing correlations between the maximal
differences for both measures. First, we computed the
correlation between MFN, computed as the difference
between fair and (very) unfair offers at Fz and Cz, and
the equivalent difference score for the cardiac response at
IBI2. These analyses did not yield a significant result,
although a marginally significant correlation was found
between the MFN at Fz for unfair stimuli and the
equivalent cardiac response, R = .40, p = .092. Second,
we computed the correlation between the MFN, computed
as the difference between accepted and rejected responses
at Fz and Cz, and the equivalent cardiac response at IBI2.
The correlations between the cardiac response and the MFN
at both Cz and Fz were marginally significant (R = .40, p =
.097 for Fz; R = .41, p = .091 for Cz).
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Fig. 5 Grand average ERPs for accepted and rejected offers at
mid-line electrodes. Both the separate ERPs and the difference
wave are shown
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Fig. 6 Cardiac response in terms of delta IBI for high offers (top
panel) and low offers (middle panel) and for accepted and rejected
offers (bottom panel)
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The present study examined the effects of fairness and offer
size on ERPs and cardiac responses in the UG. As was
expected, higher offers and fairer offers were accepted more
often. More unfair offers were accompanied by an MFN
around 400 ms after stimulus onset, which was maximal at
frontal sites. Unexpectedly, very unfair and rejected offers
were also accompanied by less cardiac deceleration.
Behavioral results were in line with the earlier studies
using a similar version of the UG (Crockett et al., 2008;
Tabibnia et al., 2008). As in these studies, both fairness and
size of the offer strongly affected the acceptance rate,
resulting in fewer accepted offers when the offer was lower
or less fair. Somewhat less expected was the interaction
between both factors, although this interaction approached
significance in one of the previous studies (Crockett et al.,
2008). The effect of fairness was stronger for high offers,
which can be interpreted in terms of fairness being
especially important when the stakes are high (enough).
The finding of MFN to less fair offers was in line with
the results of the study of Boksem and De Cremer (2010).
As in their study, the effect was maximal at frontal sites,
although we could not confirm the very frontal and slightly
lateralized effect, due to lower spatial sampling. The
maximum in our study seems to peak somewhat later,
which is probably caused by a more complex stimulus
presentation in our study. In our task, the offer was
presented visually as a differently colored part of a bar
presenting the stake, combined with a verbal representation
of the size of the actual offer and the stake, and participants
could reject or accept this offer by pushing a button. In the
study of Boksem and De Cremer, the offer was separated
into an offer part and a decision part, and ERPs were
synchronized to the offer. The offer consisted only of a
verbal description of the offer—for example, “Offers you 4
euros,” which is obviously less complex than the offer used
in the present study. Interestingly, the offer size was crucial.
Only for high offers was this fairness-related MFN found.
Size was also manipulated in the Boksem and De Cremer
study, but size in their study was completely confounded
with fairness, because they used a fixed stake and a variable
offer. The effect of offer size might be related to the relative
impact of the unfair offer. In the context of higher unfair
and very unfair offers, the low unfair and very unfair
probably have less emotional impact on the participants,
leading to the absence of the MFN for these conditions.
Our ERP results were not in line with the effects in
Polezzi et al. (2008), where an adapted version of the UG
was also used. A large difference with our study and also
the study of Boksem and De Cremer (2010) is that they
used a much faster version of the task and did not use
different players. Moreover, they repeated the five different
offers 40 times and also confounded offer size with fairness.
In contrast to both the results of Boksem and De Cremer
and our results, they reported the largest negativity for
medium offers, which are comparable to our unfair offers,
and this negativity did not differ with respect to laterality or
anterior/posterior distribution. Apparently, the MFN is
strongly dependent on the exact context of the task and
the perception of the offers by the players. Our study shows
that it makes sense to disentangle size and fairness of the
offer but that other factors, such as the pace of the task, the
believability of the social context, and other social and
emotional factors, most likely play important roles too. It
has been suggested that the MFN might reflect social pain,
social norm violation, conflict, or outcomes that are worse
than expected. In our view, the present results show that the
MFN in the UG is strongly context dependent and does not
simply reflect the discrepancy between expected outcome
and real outcome. This makes an explanation in terms of
social norm violation, conflict, or outcomes that are worse
than expected less likely, because they all seem to depend
strongly on this discrepancy. Moreover, reaction time data
seem to rule out an explanation in terms of conflict. If a
larger MFN is related to more conflict, it would be expected
that these higher conflict trials would be accompanied by
longer reaction times. However, reaction times were
affected by fairness only for the low offers, and the effects
were opposite to what was expected, with faster responses
for less fair offers. MFN was found only for high offers,
and therefore, an explanation in terms of conflict does not
fit the present data. An interpretation in terms of social
pain, which can accommodate contextual effects of the size
of the experienced unfairness, seems to fit our data best,
which is more or less in line with the interpretation of
Boksem and de Cremer.
The finding that unfair or rejected offers evoked slightly
less cardiac slowing was not in line with our hypotheses
and previous findings. Osumi and Ohira (2009) reported
enhanced cardiac slowing after unfair offers, as compared
with fair offers, and this effect was even more pronounced
for rejected than for accepted offers. An important
difference with the present study is that the actual offer
and the decision were separated in the study of Osumi and
Ohira. In the present study, the cardiac response to the offer
reflects both stimulus evaluation and response processes,
whereas in the Osumi and Ohira study, it reflects only
evaluation. A possible effect of these additional response
processes is that the motor initiation process following the
decision might have ended cardiac deceleration and started
cardiac acceleration earlier in the present study (Jennings,
van der Molen, Somsen, & Terezis, 1990) leading to a
shortened decelerative response depending on the actual
reaction time. In this way, it could lead to differences
between fair and unfair offers only if RT differed between
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2011) 11:516–525 523these categories. Although fairness did influence RT, we
did not find a main effect of fairness, but only an
interaction between fairness and offer size, and the effect
of fairness on low offers was only marginally significant.
So, this small and differential effect on RT could only
partly explain the attenuated deceleration for low unfair
offers and could not explain the larger acceleration for
high unfair offers. Furthermore, it should be noted that
the cardiac deceleration in the Osumi and Ohira study
peaked earlier and lasted for a shorter time than did the
deceleration in the present study, which makes an
explanation in terms of interrupted deceleration even
more difficult. Finally, offer size had a bigger and more
consistent effect on RT, but offer size did not have any
effect on cardiac deceleration.
We would like to argue that the differences between the
present findings and the findings of Osumi and Ohira (2009)
might be related to the different contexts in which the unfair
offers were presented. In the Osumi and Ohira study, one
third of the offers were unfair, whereas the other two thirds
of the offers were fair or even advantageous for the
responder. This means that unfair offers were unexpected
not only in the sense of a violation of a social convention,
but also in the sense of a less frequent event. In the present
study, the fair offers were the less frequent event, and in this
way, unfair offers were more expected. This expectancy
effect has been shown to play an important role in cardiac
responses to stimuli, with more unexpected events leading to
more cardiac deceleration (Crone, Bunge, de Klerk, & van
der Molen, 2005; Crone et al., 2003). In this way, the
expectancy effect could have played a major role in causing
differences between fair and unfair offers. This could also
explain why the size of the offer did not affect cardiac
decelerations. If the cardiac response for a major part reflects
expectancy violation, the size of the offer does not play a
role, because differently sized offers were presented with the
same probability. An interpretation in terms of expectancy is
in line with the traditional view that the fast decelerative
response following motivationally relevant stimuli is part of
the OR (Graham & Clifton, 1966) and the recent suggestion
that the processes underling the OR and the P3 are strongly
related (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011). In the present study and
in previous studies using the UG (Boksem & De Cremer,
2010; Polezzi et al., 2008), no clear P3 could be measured,
and no effects on P3 were reported. In the present study, this
might be related to large variation in reaction time, whereas
in other studies, the separation of evaluation and decision
might also have played a role. Future studies should aim at
designing tasks in which both MFN and P3 can be measured
at the same time and in which the possible differential effects
of simple expectancy violation and outcomes being worse
than expected on these different components can be studied
simultaneously.
The dissociation between cardiac and ERP results is
remarkable and was also found in the different correla-
tion patterns. The MFN amplitude correlated positively
with percentage of accepted offers, whereas cardiac
deceleration correlated negatively. For the brain re-
sponse, the correlation was positive and was found
when accepted and rejected offers were compared,
whereas the correlation with cardiac measures was
negative and was strongest when fair and unfair offers
were compared. The MFN to accepted and rejected
offers more strongly reflects the decisional part of the
offer, and therefore, the correlation with performance
can be seen as a relation between the decisional aspect
of the MFN and the actual decision. The cardiac
response to fair and (very) unfair offers, on the other
hand, more strongly reflects the evaluative aspect of the
offer, and therefore, the correlation with performance
can be seen as a relation between the evaluative aspect
of the cardiac response and the actual decision. Both
probability (other than expected) and the effect of the
offer being worse than expected are thought to affect
cardiac deceleration and MFN in a comparable way
(Mies et al., 2011; Van der Veen et al., 2008). For
instance, in a study by Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, van den
Wildenberg, and Ridderinkhof (2003), it was found that
the N2 to no-go stimuli in a go–no-go task, which was
thought to be related to response inhibition, was strongly
dependent on stimulusfrequency.Inaconditionwherethego
stimulus was the less frequent stimulus, they found a reversal
of effects and found an N2 to go stimuli. This shows the
importance of probability for the N2, a component that is
thought to be closely related to the family of the MFNs. It
shouldbe noted, however, thatresults for the feedback-related
negativity are less conclusive (Hajcak, Holroyd, Moser, &
Simons, 2005; Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen,
2003). In a similar way, we have shown in a number of
studies (Crone et al., 2005; Crone et al., 2003; Van der Veen
et al., 2004a, b, 2008) that cardiac deceleration is enhanced
when outcomes are worse than expected. More research
is obviously needed to disentangle the conflicting effects
of stimulus probability and desirability of the outcome on
both cardiac responses and brain activation.
Due to the absence of strong correlations between
autonomic and brain responses and the differential
sensitivity of these measures to the task manipulations,
the present results do not provide evidence for a possible
causal relation between these responses. In this way, no
support is provided for the somatic marker hypothesis,
which states that autonomic changes could serve as a
possible input to guide decision making (Damasio,
1996). It should be emphasized, however, that the present
s t u d yw a sn o td e s i g n e dt ot e s tt h es o m a t i cm a r k e r
hypothesis.
524 Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2011) 11:516–525To summarize, the UG is a useful tool for examining the
interaction between emotional and cognitive processes and
the integration of these processes within the brain and body.
Unfair offers are clearly perceived as undesirable, and this
undesirability is reflected in a brain response that is similar to
the response to outcomes that are worse than expected and
stimuli with conflicting or competing responses. Cardiac
responsesseemfarmoresensitivetothebasicexpectednessof
the stimulus, but more research is needed to disentangle the
competing influences of probability and outcome.
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